Burden of Proof in Juvenile Proceedings, The by Todd, Alton C.
SMU Law Review
Volume 23 | Issue 5 Article 7
1969
Burden of Proof in Juvenile Proceedings, The
Alton C. Todd
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alton C. Todd, Burden of Proof in Juvenile Proceedings, The, 23 Sw L.J. 914 (1969)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol23/iss5/7
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23
attempt to analyze per se violations which are not per se illegal, two com-
mentators have been prompted to lament: "We would . . .like to register
a plea for more readily comprehensible court decisions."4
G. Lee Hart
The Burden of Proof in Juvenile Proceedings
George Santana, fourteen, was tried for rape in juvenile court, The jury,
by a preponderance of the evidence, found that George Santana had com-
mitted the act of rape and was a delinquent child.' The court of civil
appeals reversed, holding that under In re Gault' delinquency must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' Held, reversed: In a juvenile proceed-
ing, due process does not require that the delinquency of the juvenile be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Santana, 444 S.W.2d 614
(Tex. 1969).
I. CRIMINAL VERSUS CIVIL BURDENS OF PROOF
In all American jurisdictions criminal guilt must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.4 This rule is based upon the Anglo-American concept
of personal liberty as a most important element in a free society.' Because
the consequences of a criminal conviction are so severe, resulting in dam-
age to reputation, future livelihood, career, and loss of liberty or life,"
44 Baldwin & McFarland, Some Observations on "Per Se" and Tying Arrangements, 6 ANTITRUST
BULL. 433 (1961).
'TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 3 (1964):
The term 'delinquent child' means any female person over the age of ten (10) years
and under the age of eighteen (18) years and any male person over the age of ten
(10) years and under the age of seventeen (17) years:
(a) who violates any penal law of this state of the grade of felony;
(b) or who violates any penal law of this state of the grade of misdemeanor where
the punishment prescribed for such offense may be by confinement in jail;
(c) or who habitually violates any penal law of this state of the grade of misde-
meanor where the punishment prescribed for such offense is by pecuniary fine only;
(d) or who habitually violates any penal ordinance of a political subdivision of this
state;
(e) or who habitually violates a compulsory school attendance law of this state;
(f) or who habitually so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals or
health of himself or others;
(g) or who habitually associates with vicious and immoral persons.
2387 U.S. 1 (1967).
aSantana v. State, 431 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
'For a comprehensive list of cases, see H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 51 (4th ed.
1935).
aF. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.6, at 251 (1965). See also Spieser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
525-26 (1958). The reasonable doubt standard seems to have had its origin no earlier than the
latter part of the eighteenth century. At first it was applied only in capital cases, but there was
no "fixed phrase" of "beyond reasonable doubt." "A clear impression," "Iupon clear grounds," and
"satisfied" are the earlier phrases, and then "rational doubt" came into use. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2497, at 317 (1940). The phrase first appeared in the high-treason cases tried in Dublin in
1798. May, Some Rules of Evidence, 10 AM. L. REv. 642, 658 (1876). The rule was enlarged upon
by Starkie in 1824, when the reaction in the public mind against the atrocities of the penal code
was at its height. The result of the evidence must be proved to the "exclusion of all reasonable
doubt." 1 T. STARRKIE, LAW OF EVIDENCE 477 (1837).
6H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 7 (4th ed. 1935).
a heavy burden of proof has been imposed upon the prosecution.!
Various efforts have been made to define "beyond a reasonable doubt."
One that has been quoted many times is the statement made by Chief
Justice Shaw of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Webster: "[T]he
evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral
certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and
satisfies the reason and judgment."' Definitions differ from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, but all convey basically the same idea.'
The typical burden of proof standard for civil cases is by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. The "extreme caution and the unusual positiveness
of persuasion"'1 demanded in criminal trials is not required. The difference
between the two standards cannot be reduced to a mathematical formula,
but the reasonable doubt requirement is considered to be the more con-
clusive standard. The reasonable doubt test impresses upon the trier of
fact the necessity of reaching a decision which is free of any suspicions,
while the preponderance of the evidence test allows doubts to exist in the
mind of the trier of the fact, and merely asks the trier to weigh the evi-
dence and to support the side which best convinced his mind of the truth
of the matter."
In Texas, the standard of proof in a juvenile proceeding has been that
delinquency need be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence."
The reason for the utilization of this typically civil test is that jurisdiction
over juvenile offenders has been transferred from criminal courts to civil
courts, ' and therefore civil rules of procedure are applied.
II. IN RE GAULT AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF
In re Gault"6 afforded the United States Supreme Court an opportunity
to take a hard look at the juvenile court system. The court recognized
that being adjudged a juvenile delinquent creates a stigma only slightly
less than that of a criminal, and that the so-called benefits of secret pro-
ceedings are "more rhetoric than reality."'" Information concerning these
proceedings is often furnished to the military, the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, government agencies, and "even to private employers."' More-
over, when a child is committed to an institution, whether it is called a
730 AM. JuR. 2D Evidence § 1170 (1967).8 5 Cush. 295 (Mass. 1850). See also Commonwealth v. Costley, 118 Mass. 1 (1875).
95 Cush. at 320.
10 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2497, at 317 (1940).
"Id. § 2498, at 325.
12F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.6 (1965).
" State v. Ferrell, 209 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), error ref. n.r.e.; Cantu v. State,
207 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Robinson v. State, 204 S.W.2d 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).14 TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, S 1 (1964).
" State v. Thomasson, 154 Tex. 151, 275 S.W.2d 463 (1955); Steed v. State, 143 Tex. 82,
183 S.W.2d 458 (1944); Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944).
16 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
''Id. at 24.
's Id., citing Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized justice,
79 HARv. L. REV. 775, 784-85 (1966), and NATIONAL CRIME COMMISSION REPORT 87-88 (1966).




"reform school," "receiving home," or an "industrial school," it is con-
finement very similar to an adult prison." Both juveniles and adults are
confined for long periods of time and their companions are inmates whose
crimes range up to murder. Furthermore, juvenile commitment is indefi-
nite in nature and may exceed the maximum penalty that could be assessed
an adult convicted of the same offense. For these reasons the informal
procedure in juvenile court that was meant to remove the criminal taint
from the proceedings was held to be violative of due process." Specifically,
the Court found that Gault's right to due process had been infringed by
failure to accord him: (1) notice of charges; (2) counsel; (3) privilege
against self-incrimination; and (4) the opportunity for cross-examination
and confrontation." The Court observed, "Juvenile Court history has
again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently moti-
vated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure. '
Notwithstanding the breadth of the opinion, confusion has arisen over
the extent of the protection determined in Gault. One of the points of
controversy is the appropriate burden of proof. The Supreme Court did
not expressly hold that the burden of proof should be beyond a reason-
able doubt as in adult criminal trials, but it did hold that certain funda-
mental rights cannot be denied to juveniles. Consequently, some jurisdic-
tions have found the higher burden of proof to be one of those rights, and
thus impliedly required by Gault.' A greater number, however, have con-
tinued to follow the pre-Gault standard, holding that since it was not
expressly decided by the Court, the greater standard is not constitutionally
required. 4
Preponderance of the Evidence Rule. The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia has consistently adhered to the civil rule.' The court has
held that the application of the "strictly criminal law concept of guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt" to juvenile proceedings "would be both un-
necessary and improper."' " This is apparently because such a standard
runs counter to the congressional establishment of a "professionally staffed,
specialized court, equipped with broad powers to implement the rehabili-
tative purposes of the Juvenile Court Act." 7
In State v. Arenas" the Oregon supreme court also held that the be-
yond a reasonable doubt standard was not required by Gault. The court
"2In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
'OId. at 30, citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 563 (1966).
21 387 U.S. at 10.
" Id. at 18.
2United States v. Costanzo, 395 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1968); In re Urbasek, 232 N.E.2d 716
(Ill. 1968); De Backer v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508 (1968).
24In re M., 450 P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969); W. v. Family Court, 247 N.E.2d 253 (N.Y.
1969); State v. Arenas, 453 P.2d 915 (Ore. 1969); In re Ellis, 253 A.2d 789 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.
1969).
'In re Ellis, 253 A.2d 789 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1969); In re Wylie, 231 A.2d 81 (D.C. Mun.
Cc. App. 1966); In re Bigesby, 202 A.2d 785 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1964).
2'ln re Bigesby, 202 A.2d 785, 786 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1964).
271n re Ellis, 253 A.2d 789, 791 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1969), citing Creek v. State, 379 F.2d
106 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
28453 P.2d 915 (Ore. 1969).
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agreed that although the right to be found guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt is not specifically stated in either the Oregon or the United States
Constitution, "such right is one inherent in the Due Process Clause of
both constitutions."29 However, the court did not hold that this right should
be extended to the juvenile, because such a decision would make it difficult
to administer the juvenile system. It recognized that certain juvenile court
procedures were valid subjects of criticism, but felt that "[i]t would be a
serious error of judicial policy . . . to raise all aspects of such criticism to
the immutable stature of constitutional deficiencies."'
Further reasons for retaining the preponderance of the evidence standard
were furnished by the New York court of appeals in W. v. Family Court."
In New York the standard is expressly stated by statute and the court
found that "the delinquency status is not made a crime; and the pro-
ceedings are not criminal."32 The court apparently reasoned that the bene-
fits of the statute far outweigh the detriments, and that since the statute
labels the proceedings as civil, then only a civil standard of proof is re-
quired.'
The Supreme Court of California in In re M.' also held that Gault
did not require the application of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
in juvenile proceedings. The court rejected the higher standard because
it would "introduce a strong tone of criminality into the proceedings"'
and would thus defeat the object of the juvenile system. Therefore, it
found that this higher standard would be inappropriate in a juvenile court
where "the proceedings are . . . conducted for the protection and benefit
of the youth ...."'
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Rule. The Supreme Court of Illinois adopted
the criminal rule in In re Urbasek" The court argued that "it would
seem that the reasons which caused the Supreme Court to import the con-
stitutional requirements of an adversary criminal trial into delinquency
hearings logically require that a finding of delinquency for misconduct,
which would be criminal if charged against an adult, is valid only when
the acts of delinquency are proved beyond a reasonable doubt .... ' The
court determined that it would not be consistent with due process and
equal protection to provide two sets of rules based on age when the end
result for both is the same.
In United States v. Costanzo' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that "a federal juvenile proceeding which may
lead to institutional commitment must be regarded as 'criminal' . . . . No
19 Id. at 917.
30 id. at 915-20.
32247 N.E.2d 253 (N.Y. 1969).
32 id. at 257.
8 Id.
34450 P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
35450 P.2d at 302-03.
36 Id. at 303.
97232 N.E.2d 716 (11. 1968).
38 Id. at 719.
395 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1968).
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verbal manipulation ...can convert a four-year commitment following
conviction into a civil proceeding.""0 The court concluded that a high
degree of proof ranks as high as any other protection.'
In De Backer v. Brainard' four of the seven justices of the Nebraska
supreme court felt that delinquency must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt and that the Nebraska statute' was unconstitutional. The apparent
rationale of the court was that a proceeding which may result in institu-
tional commitment is criminal rather than civil in nature. Therefore, the
court decided that juvenile proceedings "are at least sufficiently criminal
in nature that the constitutional rights involving due process in criminal
cases must be applied." However, because of a peculiarity of the Ne-
braska Constitution,"' the statute prescribing the preponderance of the
evidence standard is still in effect even though the majority of the court
held it to be unconstitutional.
Summary. The jurisdictions which have considered the issue subsequent
to Gault and follow the preponderance of the evidence rule seem to have
based their conclusions on the grounds that: (1) a higher standard of
proof would create difficulties in the administration of the juvenile system's
objectives; (2) juvenile proceedings are civil in nature and not criminal;
and (3) Gault did not specifically require the higher standard. Conversely,
the courts, which have adopted the beyond a reasonable doubt rule con-
tend that if the proceeding can result in commitment, it is criminal in
nature. Furthermore, although Gault did not expressly enumerate this
standard as being constitutionally required, the full scope of the opinion
sufficiently implies and justifies reaching the conclusion.
III. WHO GETS THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT: JUVENILE OR STATE?
In State v. Santana" the Supreme Court of Texas declined to adopt the
higher standard of proof. In reaching this decision the court reasoned from
Gault that: (1) the Texas juvenile system is being properly administered
and does not deny the juvenile his constitutional rights; (2) the Supreme
Court in Gault did not find juvenile proceedings to be criminal or civil
but sui generis; and (3) Gault did not expressly decide the burden of
proof issue.
The Texas court contended that the Texas juvenile system is being
properly administered and is not one of the jurisdictions criticized by the
Gault Court. It pointed out that in a delinquency proceeding the juvenile
is afforded all of the procedural safeguards specifically enumerated in Gault
while still applying civil rules of procedure. 7 Furthermore, Texas goes
4 Id. at 444.
41 Id.
4183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508 (1968).4 NEB. REv. STAT. art. 2, § 43-206.03 (Supp. 1967).
44183 Neb. 461, 466, 161 N.W.2d 508, 511 (1968).
45NEB. CONST. art. 5, § 2, requires a concurrence of five justices to hold a statute unconsti-
tutional.
46444 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. 1969).
4 Johnson v. State, 401 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), Renya v. State, 206 S.W.2d 651
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further than most states by making a jury trial available." Therefore,
Texas is in full compliance with the due process standards of Gault. How-
ever, this reasoning does not resolve the burden of proof issue. The Texas
system may be laudable when compared to other states, but this does not
obviate the necessity of requiring the higher standard of proof, if due
process so demands.
The Supreme Court of Texas reasoned that Gault "declined to announce
that [juvenile proceedings] were either criminal or civil courts, rather
recognizing that they were sui generis."'4 Thus, Gault only requires that the
appropriate rules to be applied in the proceedings are those that guarantee
fundamental fairness. But, the Texas court apparently did not consider
the higher burden of proof to be required by fundamental fairness.
The Texas court also relied heavily on the fact that the Court in Gault
did not expressly pass upon the burden of proof issue."0 Even though Gault
did not expressly enumerate the reasonable doubt standard as a require-
ment in a juvenile hearing, it did list certain rights which heretofore were
applicable only to adult criminal trials. In requiring recognition of these
rights for juvenile proceedings the Court said, "The absence of procedural
rules based upon constitutional principle has not always produced fair,
efficient, and effective procedures. Departures from established principles
of due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but
in arbitrariness.""5 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is an estab-
lished principle of due process for criminal trials." As a principle of due
process the Gault decision may be requiring that it too should be extended
to the juvenile proceeding, since this hearing may result in commitment,
and as the Court pointed out, imprisonment is criminal in nature regard-
less of the label placed upon the proceeding.
Significantly, the facts in Santana were not as extreme as in Gault. In
Santana the maximum detention for a minor convicted of rape was seven
years."5 In the case of an adult the maximum punishment is death or life
imprisonment.54 In Gault the offense was making obscene phone calls. The
penalty for such an offense was a maximum of six years detention for the
(Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (notice of charges); Lazaros v. State, 228 S.W.2d 972 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950), Ballard v. State, 192 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (right to cross-examination and
confrontation); Dudley v. State, 219 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), error ref. (right to
counsel); Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944) (right against self-incrimina-
tion).4 5 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 13 (1964).
49444 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Tex. 1969).
"
0 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1967): "We emphasize that we indicate no opinion as to
whether the decision of that court (Arizona Supreme Court) with respect to such other issues
(including beyond a reasonable doubt) does or does not conflict with requirements of the Federal
Constitution."
51d. at 18-19.
" Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
"aTEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1188 (1961): "One under age of fourteen at time the offense
was committed cannot be convicted of rape or assault with intent to rape." TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 2338-1, § 13(2) (1964): The court may order commitment "not extending beyond
the time the child shall reach the age of twenty-one (21) years." This has been changed by TEX.
PEN. ConE ANN. art. 30 (1967): "Section 1. No person may be convicted of any offense, except
perjury, which was committed before he was 15 years of age .... "
"
4 TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1189 (1961): "A person guilty of rape shall be punished by
death or by confinement in the penitentiary for life, or for any term of years not less than five."
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juvenile, but only a fine of $50 and two months in jail for the adult.'
The unfairness of punishment was obvious in Gault, but the Supreme
Court did not base its decision on the extreme facts. It was more concerned
with the due process safeguards which were being denied the juvenile
during the adjudicatory stage.
IV. CONCLUSION
The higher standard of proof need not create rigidity in the procedure,
but would help make conclusive the decision that the youth was a de-
linquent and needed "treatment." The supreme courts of California and
Oregon, cited in the Santana opinion, both stated that "the consequences
of adopting the reasonable doubt standard in juvenile court would perhaps
be less drastic than adopting a jury system." ' Texas allows a jury trial upon
request in juvenile cases, but it does not provide this higher standard of
proof.
Certainly, it is the concern of the juvenile court, as well as the criminal
court, to protect against incorrect adjudications of guilt. The Gault deci-
sion enumerated requirements which mitigate against erroneous adjudica-
tions. The beyond a reasonable doubt standard also reduces the margin of
error in determining guilt. Gault may not require the juvenile hearing to
incorporate all of the rights enjoyed by the adult under due process, but it
is apparent that there are certain fundamental rights which are essential to
the fair administration of justice. Due to the controlling effect it may have
on a hearing, a high burden of proof ranks high as a due process safeguard.
If the juvenile courts could show results which would justify their flexible
proceedings, then due process might have a double meaning for the minor
and the adult, but as they exist today juvenile court objectives cannot
justify an adjudication of delinquency on less evidence than necessary to
find an adult guilty of a criminal offense. The direction of the juvenile
courts on this issue could be determined by the United States Supreme
Court in In re Winship."' The burden of proof question is the main issue
in this New York case. The Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdic-
tion, but it may refrain from answering the question as it has in the
past." If it does settle this troubling point, for the best interests of the
child and the state, the juvenile should be given the benefit of the doubt.
Alton C. Todd
55 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
"sState v. Santana, 444 S.W.2d 614, 621 (Tex. 1969), citing In re M., 450 P.2d 296, 302, 75
Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1969); State v. Arenas, 453 P.2d 915, 919 (Ore. 1969).
"
7 W. v. Family Court, 247 N.E.2d 253 (N.Y. 1969).
aIn re Winship, 38 U.S.L.W. 3153 (U.S. Oct. 28, 1969).
" De Backer v. Brainard, 38 U.S.L.W. 4001 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1969); In re Whittington, 391
U.S. 341 (1968); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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